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Original photo: Concorde landing (old photograph)
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Concorde landing (old photograph)
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Original photo, unretouched. The background is a version of it stylised by the site.

Sunk costs

What is already spent won't come back, yet it weighs on the decision to continue as if it could be recovered.

Reasoning error≈ 11 min readCheckedCheck doneFacts, figures and references were checked against the sources cited in the page.Written with AI assistance; sources are cited at the bottom of the page. An error? Report it via clement13.net.Reading
FrequencyUbiquitousYou meet it on almost every project or every week.
Where you meet it
  • Projects going off track
  • Go / no-go trade-off
  • Technical debt
  • Supplier contracts
  • Career management
  • Recruitment
AI helpGoodA real gain, with safeguards. See how ↓
In brief
  • What : a past investment (money, time, effort) weighs on the decision to continue, even though it is lost no matter what happens next.
  • Why : stopping means acknowledging a loss and admitting a mistake; we want to avoid “waste” and stay consistent with ourselves.
  • Detect : the main argument for continuing is “we've already invested,” “we can't stop now.”
  • Avoid : compare only future costs and benefits, set stopping criteria in advance, have someone who didn't commit the spending make the decision.
On this page

Definition#

Avatar of Hal R. ArkesFictitious illustration
Hal R. ArkesAmericandate of birth not publishedPsychologist, decision-making specialist
Avatar of Richard ThalerFictitious illustration
Richard ThalerAmericanborn September 12, 1945Economist, 2017 Nobel laureate in economics

A sunk cost (sunk cost) is spending already committed that no future decision can recover. In sound decision logic, it should not count: only the future costs and benefits of each option matter. The bias, often called the sunk cost fallacy, is the tendency to factor it in anyway—that is, to keep pursuing an action because we've already invested heavily in it.

The reference experimental demonstration is by Hal Arkes and Catherine Blumer (1985). The economic reasoning is much older; Richard Thaler linked it to choice psychology as early as 1980.

The bias is not limited to money: time (“I spent three months on it”), effort (“we rewrote everything”), and reputation (“I defended this choice before the committee”) weigh just as much.

The mechanism#

Several drivers combine:

  • Aversion to waste : giving up means “losing for good” what we put in. As long as we continue, the loss stays virtual; it becomes real when we stop (see Loss aversion).
  • Consistency and self-image : changing course means admitting the previous decision was bad, which carries reputational and self-esteem costs.
  • Mental accounting : we keep a “project account” and want to close it in the black. That account closes only if we go all the way.
  • Hope of making it back : we think a little more effort will be enough to make it all worthwhile, which brings the bias close to Optimism bias.
Decision:continue or stop?What has already beenspent“Stopping would meanlosing everything and admittinga mistake”We continueeven if what comes nextdoesn't pay offCosts and benefitsfrom now on onlyCompare:continue, stop,redirectSafeguardsstopping criteria written in advance“start from scratch”outside decision-makerbefore
The left path is sound reasoning: compare only possible future paths. The biased path feeds past spending into the calculation, skewing the comparison in favor of continuing.Hover over or tap an element to read its details.
The ski trip experiment

Arkes and Blumer (1985) tell students they bought two trips for the same weekend: one for $100 to Michigan, the other for $50 to Wisconsin, which they think is more enjoyable. Both trips are nonrefundable and they can take only one. A majority of participants chooses the more expensive trip, therefore the less enjoyable one, because it cost more. In another field experiment, buyers of theater subscriptions at Ohio University were randomly charged full price or a discount: those who paid full price attended performances more often in the first half of the season.

Where you encounter it#

In project management#

  • Project drift : “we've already spent 800,000 euros, we're not going to stop at 90%.” The displayed completion percentage is often itself optimistic.
  • Go / no-go arbitration : the committee compares the cost already incurred with the initial budget instead of comparing remaining cost with remaining value.
  • Technical debt : a shaky component is kept “because we spent two years writing it,” even though rewriting or replacing it would cost less than continuing to work around it.
  • Choosing a tool or vendor : the license is paid for three years, training is done, so we keep the tool even when an alternative would save several hours per week.
  • Branches and features : people refuse to remove development never used because it was expensive.

In management#

  • Hiring and assignment : someone struggling is kept in a role because we've invested in their training or onboarding period.
  • Reorganization : a team, site, or business line is maintained on the grounds of resources already committed.
  • Training plans and internal initiatives : a program launched by an executive keeps getting funded so they don't lose face.
  • Personal career : staying in a path or role “after so many years of investment.”
In a BI project

Continuing a data model or report because many workdays have been invested in it, even though its uses have disappeared. Ask the question at every review: if we started from scratch today, would we build it this way?

Famous cases#

Famous case

Concorde, or the “Concorde effect” 1962-2003#

Biases at play: sunk costs, escalation of commitment.

29 novembre 1962Franco-British development treaty
environ 70 M£initial program estimate
1,5 à 2,1 Md£estimated cost in 1976
20 appareilsbuilt, including 14 delivered to airlines

What happened. On November 29, 1962, France and the United Kingdom signed a treaty to jointly develop a supersonic airliner. The program was then estimated at about £70 million. The first flight took place on March 2, 1969, in Toulouse, and commercial service began on January 21, 1976. In the meantime, program cost had multiplied by more than twenty (£1.5 to £2.1 billion depending on estimates), order prospects had collapsed, and both governments had long known the aircraft would not be profitable. The treaty is often described as containing no exit clause, which would have made withdrawal politically very costly. The aircraft stopped commercial flights in 2003.

Program cost (millions of pounds)1962 estimate: about 70cost in 1976: from 1,500 to 2,100 (lower bound)
Initial 1962 estimate and order of magnitude of cost in 1976 (lower bound of the £1.5 to £2.1 billion range). Approximate figures, not adjusted for inflation.

The case gave its name to the “Concorde effect”: Richard Dawkins and Tamsin Carlisle used it in 1976 in the journal Nature to describe continuing an already heavy investment. Arkes and Ayton (1999) later showed this error is mainly a human trait, found much less in animals.

What this illustrates

What had been spent should not have entered the calculation: only comparison between remaining cost and remaining value mattered. A caveat: the Concorde story also includes political, industrial, and prestige reasons, and we cannot claim bias alone explains everything. It remains the best-known example of how hard it is to stop something already expensive.

Field study

The theater subscription 1985#

Biases at play: sunk costs, mental accounting.

In Arkes and Blumer's study (1985, experiment 1), customers buying a theater subscription at Ohio University were randomly given a ticket at full price or at a discount (one of the two discounts was larger than the other). The researchers then counted, in real life, the performances each person attended. In the first half of the season, those who had paid full price came more often than those who had received a discount; the gap disappeared in the second half, when the “weight” of the paid price faded.

What this illustrates

Same show, same seat: only the price paid changed, and it influenced attendance. This experiment has the advantage of observing real behavior rather than questionnaire responses. The paid price weighs on the decision, even though it is lost in all cases.

Famous case

Elf's “sniffer planes” (France) 1976-1979 ; revealed in 1983#

Biases at play: sunk costs (with wishful thinking).

1976-1979funded by Elf, revealed in 1983
400 puis 500 M de francstwo of the three contracts (May 1976, June 1978)
1979decisive test by physicist Jules Horowitz

What happened. Two inventors claimed they could detect oil deposits from an airplane thousands of meters underground; the state-owned oil group Elf funded them for three years for hundreds of millions of francs. The process was a hoax. The hundreds of millions of francs already spent weighed on the decision to continue: stopping means recognizing the money is lost and that the original decision was wrong. Contracts followed one another until a simple test in 1979 ended the episode.

The full account, with sources and limitations, is in the Wishful thinking page.

What this illustrates

Compare only future costs and benefits; assign the continue/stop decision to someone who didn't commit the spending.

Detection signals#

  • “We've already invested too much to stop.”
  • “If we stop now, everything we've done will have been for nothing.”
  • Budget consumed is cited as an argument for continuing, rather than the work remaining.
  • The decision is made by the person who launched the initiative, or by a committee that already approved it.
  • The more the project struggles, the more requests for additional resources are presented as “the final push.”
  • People compare the current state with the initial budget, never with what would be decided if starting from scratch today.

Avoidance reflexes#

  1. Look only at the future. For each option, list only future costs and benefits. What has already been spent belongs in the history, not in the calculation.
  2. Ask: “If we were starting from scratch today, would we launch this project?” If the answer is no, continuing should be justified on other grounds.
  3. Set stop criteria in advance. Cost threshold, date, value indicator: decide before committing under which conditions you stop (see Escalation of commitment).
  4. Have an outsider make the call. A decision-maker who did not commit the spending or defend the original choice is less sensitive to the bias.
  5. Break commitment into stages. Fund in phases, with a real decision point (and the possibility of stopping) at each stage.
  6. Make stopping honorable. Highlight what has been learned, talk about “reorientation” and knowledge capture, so stopping is not experienced as an admission.
  7. Run a pre-mortem. Before renewing funding, imagine the project failed in one year and look for why.

With AI: detect, fix, mitigate#

Estimated AI support: fairly good

AI can play the role of an outside decision-maker: it did not commit the spending and can recalculate “from scratch.” It can also spot, in meeting minutes, arguments focused on the past. But it follows the reasons you give it: if you present the project as “almost finished,” it will tend to reinforce that view.

Detect#

  • Identify in steering committee minutes past-oriented arguments (“already spent,” “we've come too far”).
  • Compare the announced remaining budgets from one committee to the next: they do not go down while progress stalls.
  • Flag statements that mix up committed cost and remaining cost.

Fix#

  • Redo a “tabula rasa” analysis: remaining cost, expected value, alternatives.
  • Produce scenarios for stopping, scope reduction, and continuation, with their future costs.
  • Draft the rationale for a stop presented as a reorientation (what is retained, what is learned).

Mitigate#

  • Have stop criteria written at kickoff, then revisited at each review.
  • Have AI play devil's advocate before any request for additional funding.
  • Require each continuation decision to be expressed using future-only arguments.

Prompts to integrate into your practices#

1. “From scratch” analysis. To use before a continue-or-stop committee meeting.

Here is the situation of a project: [goal, scope, progress status, remaining work, expected value, alternatives].
Completely ignore what has already been spent (money, time, effort). Assume I am discovering this topic today.
1. Estimate, with a range, the remaining cost and duration to reach the goal, and indicate the most fragile assumptions.
2. Compare three options based only on future costs and benefits: continue, reduce scope, stop.
3. State under which conditions each is preferable.
4. End with one sentence: would we launch this project today, at this cost?

2. Find past-based reasoning in meeting minutes. On anonymized committee or review minutes.

Here are project review minutes (names removed). Identify the arguments in favor of continuing and classify them:
- those based on what has already been spent or done (past);
- those based on what remains to be done, gained, or lost (future).
Quote the exact sentences. Conclude in one sentence: does the decision seem mainly justified by the past? Do not invent any information missing from the text.

Minutes: [text]

How to integrate them#

  • Before the committee: the project manager runs prompt 1 on their own file and notes the result, without showing it.
  • During: one person is responsible for asking the question “what if we started from scratch?”
  • After: prompt 2 is used as a process review on meeting minutes, not to blame people.

Precautions#

  • AI only knows what you give it: a flattering file yields a flattering analysis. Also provide unfavorable figures.
  • Its remaining-cost estimates are orders of magnitude, not commitments: validate them with those doing the work.
  • It may cite studies or references that do not exist: verify every source before using it.
  • Do not send budgets, contracts, or personal information to an unauthorized tool.

Limits#

  • The effect is robust in laboratory settings, but weaker among people trained in economics or decision-making, and among children or some animals, which has been discussed (Arkes and Ayton, 1999).
  • Not everything boils down to a bias: continuing may be rational if remaining cost is genuinely lower than remaining value, or if stopping creates its own costs (contractual penalties, loss of trust, site closure). These future costs legitimately matter.
  • Reputation is a real issue: a decision-maker may have an incentive not to stop. The bias then mixes with a conflict of interest, and diagnosis becomes more delicate.
  • The Concorde case is often cited in support, but the reasons for continuing were also political and industrial.

Sources and verification#

See also#

Combines with, or reinforces#

These biases feed each other.

Variants or cousins: not to be confused.

What neutralises it.